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International Law Situations
WITH SOLUTIONS AND NOTES

SITUATION

I

GOODS ON NEUTRAL MEROHAN'l' VESSEL

States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
A cruiser of X meets a private m:erchant vessel flying
the flag of state Z. The papers of the vessel show that
port 0 in state Y is the last port of .call for the merchant
vessel. The vessel has the follo~wing cargo : One-sixth
raw molasses and one-sixth petroleum, consigned to port
P in state N; one-eighth iron ore and one-eighth fancy
goods, consigned to port Q in state R; one-eighth fancy
shoes for ladies, one-eighth golf suits for men, one-sixth
valuable art-rug specimens for national museum, consigned to port 0.
The master of the merchant vessel of state Z maintains
that his vessel and cargo are not liable to seizure because
of ratio and list of goods, consignment to neutral ports,
geographical location of ports with referen.ce to belligerents, and because the papers on board include a certificate of innocent character of goods from authorities of
Z as well as a letter of assurance from the consul of Y
at the port of departure.
Are these grounds sufficient to exempt the merchant
vessel from liability to seizure?
SOLUTION

The contentions of the master are not grounds sufficient to exempt the merchant vessel fro1n liability to
seizure.
NOTES

General.--While the subject of contraband has often
been discussed at this Naval War College, it ·will be conI
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venient to have a brief statement · in regard to the developinent of the principle in connection with this situation. Details as to other aspects of contraband may be
found by reference to the General Index, International
Lavv Publications, Naval \iV ar College, 1901-1920.
Definition.-Contraband implies the existence of the
idea of neutrality. The development of the idea of
neutrality is comparatively recent. Grotius gave only
scant reference to the subject and his great work first
issued in 1625 was entitled" Law of vVar and Peace."
While not using the term "contraband," Grotius . in
1625 gave a classification of articles of commerce which
has served as a basis for · the generally recognized distinctions. He enumerates:
1. Those things which have their sole use in war, such as arms.
2. Those things which have no use in war, as articles of luxury.
3. Those things which have use bo' h in war and out of war,
as money, provisions, ships, anc1 those things pertaining to ships.
(De Juri Belli ac Pacis, III, I, 5.)

Grotius fu1!ther says, in regard to the conditions under
which articles of the third class n1ay come:
In the third class, objects of ambiguous use·, the state of war
is to be considered. For if I cannot· defend myself except by
intercepting what is sent, necessity, as elsewhere explained, gives
us a right to intercept it, but under the obligation of restitution,
except there· be cause to the contrary. If the supplies: sent
impede the exaction of my rights, and if he, who sends th~m
may know this,.-as jf I were besieging· a town or blockading a
port, and if surrender or peace were expeeted, he will be bound
to me for damages; as a person would who liberates my debtor
from prison, or assists his flight to my injury; and to the
extent of the· damage his property may be taken, and ownership
thereof be assumed for the sake· of recovering my debt. If he
have not yet caused damage, but have tried to cause it, I shall
have a right by the retention of his property to compel h!m to
give security for the future by hostages, pledges, or in some other
way. But if, besides, the injustice of my enemy to me· be
very evident, and he confirms him in a most unjust war, he
will then be bound to me not only civilly, for the damage, but
also criminally, as being one who protects a manifest criminal
from the judge who is about to inflict punishment, and on that
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ground it will be lawful to take such measures against him as
are suitable to the offense, according to the principles laid down
in speaking of punishment; and therefore to that extent he may
be subjected to spoliation. (Whewell's. translation, Grotius, De
Jure Belli ac Pacis~ III, I, 5.)

The positions here taken by Grotius in regard to ·what
is no'v termed " conditional contraband " would not no-vv
be sustained even though his classification of contraband
should be generally approved.
Early practice.-1"'he classification made by Grotius
was in no way his invention, for distinctions had been
1nade 1nuch earlier than 1625, and Grotius stated the
practice 'vhich had gro,vn up among nations. A treaty
of Great Britain and Holland ( 1625) uses the word
"contraband." A British proclan1ation of 1625 mentions that commerce 'vith the enen1y in the following
articles is prohibitedany manner of graine, or victualls, or any manner of provisio~s
to serve to build, furnish, or arme any shipps of warr, or- any
kind of munition for warr, or materials for the same, being not
of the, nature of n1ere n1erchandize.

A British proclan1ation made a fe,v months later is
detailed. In this "His Maje.stie" denounces as prohibited articlesordinance, armes of all sortes, powder, shott, match, brimstone,
copper, jron, cordage of all kinds, hempe, saile, canvas, danuce
pouldavis, cables, anchors, mastes, rafters, boate ores, balcks,
capraves~ deale board, clap board, pipe staves, and vessels and
-vessel staffe. pitch, tarr. rosen, okan1, corne, graine, and victualls
of all sorts, all provisions of shipping, and all munition of warr,
or of provisions for the same, according to former declarations
and acts of state, made in this behalf in the tyme of Queen
Elizabeth, of famous memorie.

The practice before the days of Grotius had recognized goods as liable to penalty, such as arn1s, and as
free from penalty~ such as articles of luxury. Grotius
endeavors to n1ake clear that a third class should be
recognized, a class of use both for peaceful and for warlike purposes.
·
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L ater .attitudes.-As mar.i time commerce developed and
as international trade became more and more important
the demand for clear definitions of contraband became
m ore imperative. From 1780, the time of the armed
neutrality, neutrals "\vere more.positive in their assertion
of their claim that property under neutral flags should
be r espected, and the definit.i on of contraband became
clearer. Even before this date the doctrine "free ships,
free goods " had received strong support and had been
embodied in treaties, but attempts to relieve commerce
from interference became more frequent when stean1 and
other forces removed .the barriers of space.
This is evident in the case of the controversy in regard
t o coal, which became important during the Crimean
W ar ( 1854-1856) through the introduction of steam power
in vessels of 'var. The Declaration of Paris 1nentions but
does not define contraband. Great Britain maintained.
that coal was an article a~ncipitis rusus and conditional contraband. Though Secretary Cass .in 1859 regarded the
inclusion of coal as contraband as having "no just claim
for support in the law of nations," in the Civil War,
however, the Government of the United States considered coal as conditional contraband. Germany in 1870
maintained that the export of coal from Great Britajn
to France should be proh,ibited, and France reasserted
her declaration of 1859 that coal under no circumstances
should be considered contraband.
Hall said regarding coal as conditional contraband:
The view taken by England is unquestionably that which is
most appropriate to the uses of the commodity with which it
deals. Coal is employed so largely, and for so great a number of
innocent pul'J)oses, the whole daily life of many nations is so
dependent on it by its use for making gas, for driving locomotives,
and for the conduct of the most ordinary industries, that no
sufficient presumption of an intended warlike use is afforded
by the simple fact of its destination to a belligerent port. But
on the other band, it is in the highest degree noxious when
employed for certain purposes; and when its destination to such
purposes can be shown to be extremely probable, as by its con-
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signment to a port of naval equipment, or to a naval station,
such as Bermuda, or to a place used as a port of call, or as a
base of naval operations, it. is difficult to see any reason for
sparing it which would not apply to gunpowder. One · article
is as essential a condition of naval offense as is the other. (Hall's
Int. Law, 8th ed., p. 786.)

Different classifioations.-The classification of articles
carried to a belligerent would if determined by the enemy
generally be strict; if determined by a neutral liberal.
Both ·would admit that articles solely of use for purposes
of war should be contraband and usually that articles
which could not be of use in war should be free. J\1any
states, particularly in continental Europe, would make
no further classification than to say all articles which
may be used in vvar are contraband and others are free.
These differences shown by various states have usually
been due to the benefits or injury which might accrue to
the respective countries. The same state has at different
times maintained inconsistent positions. Russia in 1884
declared she would never recognize coal as contraband,
but it 'vas included in the absolute contraband list in the
Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5.
Against this inclusion Great Britain protested vigorously. In 1915 Great Britain and Russia issued identical
lists of contraband including fuel in conditional contraband.
There seemed to have been growing up during the
latter half o£ the nineteenth century a considerable support for the idea of contraband by nature and contraband
by destination.
The essential elements of contraband of war were well
stated by Historicus :
In order to constitute contraband of war, it is absolutely essential that two elements should concur-viz. a hostile quality an(l a
hostile destination. If either of these elements is wanting, there
can be no such thing as contraband. Innocent goods going to
a belligerent port are not contraband. Here there is a hostile
destination, but no hostile quality. Hostile goods, such as munitions of war, going to a neutral port are not contraband. Here-
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there is a hostile quality, but. no hostile destination.
on International Law, p. 191.)

(Historicus

The United States, Great Britain, and Japan have
usually divided the articles which might be used in war
into those solely for such use and those which might be
used for war purposes or for peace purposes, such as foodstuffs. The great difficulty was the assignment of certain articles to the proper category. Chief Justice Chase
in . the case of the Peter hoff in 1866 stated a simple fact
when he said :
The classification of goods. as. contraband or not contraband
has much perplexed text writers and jurists. A strictly accurate
and satisfactory classification is: perhaps. impracticable. (5 Wallace, p. 2'8.)

Mr. Balfour said in 1904:
I could not give a list of things which are or are not contraband of war, nor could any international lawyer fulfill any such
demand.

There had been many attempts to determine the list of
contraband by treaty agreements bet-ween two or more
states. A treaty bet,veen the United States and Prussia
of 1799, revised in 1828, ]:Jrovides in Article XIII that:
All cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bon1bs, grenades, bullets,
balls, muskets., flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses.,
p:kes, swords, belts, cartouch boxes, saddles, and bridles, beyond
the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond that
which every man serving on board the vessel or passenger ought
to have, and in general whatever is comprised under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what description so ever,
shall be deemed objects of contraband. (VIII U. S. Stat. p. 162.)

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 ther~ were
many diplomatic controversies in regard to the contraband list. In these controversies the United States and
Great Britain took important parts. Russia was brought
to admit the principle of conditional contraband as applying to certain articles." The British ambassador wrote
to the Russian foreign office on October 9, 1904:
The principle of conditional contraband has: already been
recognized by the Russian Go·vernment, and it only remains to
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extend its, appUcation to coal, cotton, and other articles which
may be used for peaceful or warlike purposes according to circumstances. Such a 1neasure would be consistent with the law
and practice of nations and with the well-established rights of
neutrals. While maintaining the rights of a belligerent, the rights
of neutrals would be respected, and the source . of a serious, and
unpr(}fitable controversy would be removed. (Parliamentary
Papers, Russia, No. 1 [1905], p. 24.)

The American position early in the nineteenth century
regarding coal as conditional contraband only is well
stated in the note o£ Mr. Choate to Lord Lansdowne o£
June 24, 1904 :
1\::IY LoRD: Referring to our recent intervievvs, in ·which you
expressed a desire to know th~ views of my Government as to
the order issued by the Russian Government on the 28th of
February last, 1naking "every kind of fuel, such as coal, naptha,
alcohol, and other similar materials, unconditionally contraband,"
I am now able to state them as follows:
These articles enter / into great consumption in the arts of
peace, to which they are vitally necessary. They are usually
treated not as "absolutely contraband of war," like articles that
are intended primarily for 'military purposes in time of war, 'such
as ordnance, arms, ammunition, etc., but rather as "conditionally
contraband"; that is to say, articles that 1nay be used for or
converted to the purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances. They may rather be classed with provisions and foodstuffs of ordinary innocent use, but ·w hich may become absolutely
contraband of war ·when actually and especially destined for
the military and naval forces of the enemy. * * * The recognition in principle, of the treatment of coal and other fuel and
raw cotton as absolutely contraband of war might ultimately lead
to a total inhibition of' the sale by neutrals to the people of
belligerent states of all articles which could be finally converted
to military uses. Such an extension of the principle, by treating
coal and all other fuel and raw cotton as absolutely contraband
of war, simply because they are shipped by a neutral to a nonblockaded port of a belligerent, would not appear to be in accord
with reasonable and lawful rights of a neutral commerce. (1904,
Foreign Relations, U. S., p. 3,34.)

International consideration.-Three years later, at the
Second Hague Conference, the British representative
proposed the entire· abolition of contraband, but no agree-
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ment could be reached by the 44 States attending, though
a tentative list of absolute contraband received general
approval but was not formally adopted.
It remained for the International Naval Conference
at London in 1908-9 attended by repres~ntatives of the
10 naval powers, to agree upon contraband lists which
were then regarded as generally s~tisfactory. This conference in the Declaration of London, signed February 26,
1909, fixed upon a list of absolute contraband, a list of
conditional contraband, and an absolutely free list.
Article 22 of the Declaration of London, the list approved
at The Hague in 1907, includes as absolute contraband 11
categories, all of which are primarily of use for war
except beasts of burden. Article 24 contains 14 categories
of conditional contraband, food and fuel being the most
important. Article 28 contains 17 categories of articles
not to be declared contraband. , Among the most important of these are raw cotton, vvool 3:nd other textiles, rubber,. metallic ores. The Declaration of London was not
ratified and its provisions as to , contraband were not
adopted in the World vVar.
Destination.-When in early days goods 'vere either
absol.:t~tely contraband or else free, all contraband goods
bou:rld..i·. direct for a belligerent country were liable to
capture and other goods were free. The destination was
l!~~ally easily determined and the l.iability was correspondingly clear. With .the introduction of the conditional contraband list the matter of destination became
much more important, for these articles, such as food and
fuel, in 1909 were liable to capture not when bound to
the belligerent country, bu.t only when bound for the
1nilitary forces, or for places wh,ich were clearly serving
to support the military forces. In general, goods whatever their nature were exempt from capture if having
a neutral destination. Goods of noncontraband nature
were exempt whateve1: .their destination. Goods of the
nature of conditional contraband were liable to capture
if destined to a mil,itary port or to military forces, but
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otherwise exempt. Goods of a warlike nature were liable
to capture if bound for the enemy's country.
lVar and co1n1nerce.-The fundamental principle was
that the fact of existence of war between states did not
create a condition of belligerency for outside parties.
The fact that France and Germany were at war did
not create a hostile rel~t,ion between Italy and either
of the belligerents. The relations of Italy remained as
·before and Italy ·would be on terms of friendship with
both belligerents. The Italian commerce should be free
as in .time of peace except for restraints necessary for
legitimate operations of war. The belligerents should
be permitted to carry on the hostilities without interference except for such restraints as would be necessary
in order that the legitimate commerce of neutrals might
be maintained.
Since the state of war is admitted as legitimate, the
~xercise of belligerent !'ights is legitimate. The exercise
of these rights in1plies the right to perform such acts as
are necessary to reduce the enemy to submissj on, provided these a.cts do not impair generally accepted neutral
rights. Here is always the point of conflict. What is
legitimate for the neutral and 'vhat is legitimate for the
belligerent~
.
The risk which the belligerent runs is that the contraband may be used against him. The risk which the
owner of contraband runs is loss through capture. The
risk which the carrier runs is loss of freight, of delay for
purpose of bringing in the contraband for adjudication,
and if vessel and contraband have the same owner the
risk that both may be condemned. Liability begins only
vvith knowledge.
·
George V of Hanover in the middle of the nineteenth
_c entury seemed to wish to extend the penalty for carry·
ing contraband and provided by law for a $500 fine or
six months' imprisonment. This penalty was to be ap1802-29-2
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plied also to the carrying of troops, dispatches, or
couriers.
Neutrality and equalization.-! t has often been maint ained that neutrality implied merely i1npartiality. It
has also been maintained that it involved equal rights
and privileges for both belligerents. In a note of June
29, 1915, from the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United States, ·it was intimated that
the Government of the United States should take measures to equalize commercial relations between the United
States and both belligerent parties. To this the United
States replied on August 12, 1915:
The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the , statement of the Imperial and ~oyal Government in regard to the exportation of arms and amn1unition from
the United States to the countries at war with Austria-Hungary
and Germany. The Government of the United States notes with
sa~isfaction the recognition by the Imperial and Royal Government of the undoubted fact that its attitude with regard to the
exportation of anns and a1nmunition from the United Sta~ es is
prompted by its intention to "maintain the strictest neutrality
and to conform to the letter of the provisions of international
treaties," but is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Government implying that the observance of the strict principles of the
law under the conditions which have developed in the present war
is insufficient, and asserting that this Government should go
beyond the long recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals
and adopt measures to "maintain an attitude of strict parity with
respect to both belligerent parties."
To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the
rules of international usage on account of special conditions the
Government of the United States can not accede. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international
practice of the past, ·would impose upon every neutral nation a
duty to sit in judgn1ent on the progress of a ~ar and to restrict
its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. The contention of the Imperial and Royal Government appears to be that
the advantages~ gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the
sea should be equaliz,ed by~ the neutral powers by the establishment of a syste1n of nonintercourse with the victor. . The Imperial
and Royal Government confines its comments to arms and am-
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n1unition, but if the principle for which it contends is sound, it
should apply with equal' force to all art:cles of contraband. A
belligerent controlling the high seas might possess an ample supply of anus and aininunition, but be in want of food and clothing.
On the novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral
nations would be obligated to place an e1nbargo on such articles
because one of the belligerents could not obtain then1 through
commercial intercourse.
But if this prillciple, so strongly urged by the I1nperial and
Royal Govenunent, should be admitted to obtain by reason of the
superiority of a belligerent at sea, ought it not to operate equally
as to a belligerent superior on land? Applying this theory of
equalization, a belligerent who lacks the necessary munitions to
contend successfully on land ought to be pennitted to purchase
the1n from neutrals, while a belligerent 'vith an abundance of war
stores or vvith the power to produce them should be debarred
from such traffic.
1.\lanifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the
Imperial and Royal Government would involve a neutral nation
in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of
international obligation, produce econo1nic confusion, and deprive
all conunerce and industry of legitin1ate fields of enterprise, already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restrictions _of war.
(Spec. Sup. An1er. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 9, July, 1915, p. 166.)

Liability for contr(J)ba((ld'.-This liability is al·ways
conditioned by the destination of the goods. Sir William
Scott, the English judge, in pronouncing in 1799 on a
cargo of cheese on board the J onge M avrga,rretha bound
from Amsterda1n to Brest, gives a statement "\vhich is
almost modern :
But the most important distinction is whether the articles were
intended for the ordinary uses of life, or even for mercantile
ships' use, or whether they were going with a h:ghly probable
destination to military use? Of the matter of fact on which the
distinction is to be applied, the nature and quality of the port to
which the articles were going is not an irrational test. If the
port is a general commercial port, it shall be understood that
the articles were going for civil use, although occasionally a
frigate or other ships of war may be constructed in that port.
On the contrary, if the great predominant character of a porr.
be that of a port of naval military equipment, it shall be intended
that the articles were going for military use, although merchant
ships resort to the same place; and although it is possible that
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the articles might have been applied to civil consumption-for it
being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article
a.naipitis usus-it is not an injurious rule which deduces both
ways in the final use from the immediate destination, and the
presumption of a hostile use founded on its destination to a
1nilitary port is very much inflamed if at the time when the
articles were going a considerable armament was notoriously preparing to which a supply of these articles would be eminently
useful. * * * I think myself warranted to pronounce these
cheeses to be contraband. (1 C. Rob., , p. 188, 189·.)

Delivery of goods.-There are in many treaties clauses
permitting the master o£ a merchant vessel to deliver to
a belligerent articles o:f contraband and then to proceed.
One of the earliest o:f these was in 1667 bet-ween Great
Britain and the United Netherlands. The United States
n1acle such a treaty ·with Sweden as early as 1783 'vhich
is still in force. The clause relating to the delivery o£
contraband in the Prussian treaty, 1799, 'vas important
in the 'Vorld ''Tar and involved 1n the negotiations
·with Germany in· regard to the American vessel, the
lVill£a1n F>. Frye, ·which 'vas sunk by the German cruiser
Prinz Eitel [i'T·z~edr~ch on the high seas on January 28,
1915. This clause is in part as :follo·ws:
And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being
engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting
merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and
Inilitary stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the
vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the
ene1nies of the other, shall be deemed contraband so as to induce
confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals.
Nevertheless it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles,
and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may
think necessary to prevent the· inconvenience or dmnage that
Inight ensue frmn their
, proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable
compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors, and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of
the captors, the whole or any part of ·the military stores so
detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be
ascertained by the current price· at the place of its destination.
But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the n1aster of the vessel stopped will deliver out the
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goods supposed to be of contraband nature he shall be admitted to
do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any
port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her
voyage. (8 U. S. Stats. 162, 168; also U. S. Treaties and Conventions, 1776-1909, vol. 2, p. 1729.)

Doubtful destination.-Destination is not alvvays easy
to prove, but in case of reasonabTe doubt the belligerent is
justified in bringing in a vessel supposed to be engaged in
carriage of contraband. This doubt may be due to irregularity of the vessel's papers or to other reasons. The
commander of the belligerent ship can not act in a judicial capacity and in case of doubt should send a vessel
to the prize court.
As conditional contraband was liable to capture only
when bound for the military forces or use, it is not
always easy to determine the course of action to be taken
by a belligerent commander. The Declaration of London
of 1909 endeavored to render such destination more clear
and provided in article 34 that :
There is presumption of the destination referred to in Article
33 if the consignment is addressed to enemy authorities, or to
a merchant, established in the ene1ny country, and when it is
well known that this merchant supplies articles and n1aterial
of this kind to the ene1ny. The presumption is the san1e if the
ccnsignment is destined to a fortified place of the enemy, or to
another place serving as a base for the annecl forces of the enemy ;
this presun1ption, however, does not apply to the 1nerchant vessel
herself bound for one of these places and of which vessel it is
sought to show the contraband character. (1909, N. W. C. Int.
Law, Topics, p. 83.)

According to article 35 the ship's papers were to be
"conclusive proof of the voyage of the vessel as also
of the port of discharge of the goods." Great Britain,
France, and Russia in 1914 greatly extended the liability
by pronouncing liable .to capture goods of the nature of
conditional contraband bound for a neutral port if consigned "to order," to a consignee in enemy's territory,
or if it is not clear to whom the consign1nent is made.
The burden of proof of innocent character of the cargo
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is placed upon the owners of such goods, and if an
enemy is dra·wing supplies for its forces from a neutral
country even 1nore stringent rules may be applied.
Contraband lists.-It ·was thought in 1909 that a list of
contraband and regulations for its capture which ·would
be satisfactory for many years had been drawn, but in
1914 the greater 1naritime po·wers sho\ved a disposition to
depart fron1 its provisions and arbitrarily to establish
lists which should be for their presumed and temporary
advantage. Clearly it ·would have been better for the
·world and probably for the belligerents themselves to
abide by some general agree1nent which had been dra·wn
by representatives of the great mariti1ne powers in a
time of peace. Controversies raged in regard to the
treat1nent of cotton, food, and other articles. Neutral
states ·were irritated by restraints on trade. It is evident
that an equable adjustment. of belligerent and neutral
rights ·would have been far better ev~n in time of hostilities and that to 1naintain the principles of justice is
not merely expedient but an evidence of farseeing
statesmanship.
British and continenta:l vietos.-The British Royal
Con1mission of Supply of Food and Raw Material in
Time of War in 1905 says in regard to the- difference
between the British and continental points of vie\Y In
regard to contraband that:
All discussions as to the nature of the goods which 1nay be
treated as contraband start with the threefold distinction bebYeen
things which are useful only in war, things which are useless for
war, and things which are useful both in 'var and in peace. As
to articles of the first class, there is practically no difference of
opinion. Cannon, bayonets, uniforn1s and ammunition. for instance. are ad1nitted on all hands to be contraband of war; the
sole question being whether only finished articles are of this
character. or whether the character is shared also by their component parts. and by machinery for putting the1n together. Articles of the second class, e·. g., a piano or a portrait by Gainsborough, are as obviously~'' innocent." It is as to the third class
of articl~s, res a.n.c"-ipit.vs nsu,s, that controversies have arisen;
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and here two opposing schools of opinion have to be reckoned
with. According to what may be called the " Continental school,"
the tern1 "contraband " covers only articles the use of which is
exclusively warlike; while according to what 1nay be called the
"British school," which is also that of the United States, the
list of contraband is. an elastic one, comprising not only such
"absolutely " contraband articles as would be included in the
first category Inentioned above, but also articles which are
" conditionally" or " relatively " contraband with reference to the
special character of the war. It would appear, however, that the
oprwsition b2t\veen the Continental and British views is not unlikely to end in a reasonable comprmnise. Already Continental
lists tend to include the materials out of which, and the machinery by means of which, arn1s. and ammunition are Inanufactured;
while the "conditional " contraband of the British school is
admittedly restricted to articles indicated as noxious by special
circtunstances, and it is subjected only to the mitigated penalty of
p1·e-8xemption instead of to confiscation. (Vol. I, p. 23, sec. 96.)

Ratio.-With reference to the ratio of contraband in
a vessel's cargo, the question is usually as to its effect
upon the liability of the vessel. There have been differing doctrines as to the proportion of contraband that
vvould make the vessel liable to confiscation. The Declaration of London reached an -agreement ·which seemed
generally acceptable, in 1909.
AR'riCLE

40

The confiscation of the vessel carrying contraband is allowed
if tlle contraband forms, either by v·alue, by weight, by volttme or
by freight, 1nore than half the cargo.

It was universally admitted, however, that in eerta:n cases
the conde1nnation of the contraband does not suffice, and that con·
demnation should extend to the vessel herself, but opinions differed as to the detennination of these cases. It was decided to
fix upon a certain proportion between the contraband and the
total cargo.
But the question divides itself: (1) "\Vhat shall be the
proportion? The solution adopted is the n1ean between those
proposed, which ranged frmn a quarter to three quarters. (2)
How shall this proportion be reckoned? :Must the contraband
form 1nore than half the cargo in voluine, weight, value, or
freight? The adoption of a single fixed standard gives rise to
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theoretical objections, and also encourages practices intended to
a void concle1nnation of the vessel in spite of the ilnportance of
the cargo. If the standard of volume or weight is adopted, . the
master will ship innocent goods sufficien'Uy bulky, or w·eighty
in order that the volun1e or weight of the contraband 1nay be
less. A silnilar remark may be made as regards the value or
the freight. The consequence is that it suffices, in order to justify
condemnation, that the contraband shoulcl fonn 1nore than half
the cargo according to any one of the points of' view 1nentioned.
This 1nay sce1n severe; but, on tne one hand, proceeding in any
other 1nanner would make fraudulent calculations easy, and, on
the other, it may be said that the condemnation of the vessel is
justified when the carriage of contraband forn1ecl an in1portant
part of her venture, \vhich is true in each of the· cases. specified.
(General Report, 1909, Naval 'Var College, p. 89.)

This point o-f vie·w vvas upheld by belligerents generally in the World War as equable. It vvas affirmed that
ignorance could not be rationally affirn1ed if more than
half the cargo vvas contraband.
In the case of the H aika({LJ, there vvas raised in the
British prize court several questions. These vvere:
First·, apart from any Resolutions or Articles. of the London
Conference, what was the· ruJe of the law of nations affecting a
vessel which in the circumstances of this case was carrying a
cargo consisting wholly of contraband destined for the· enemy?
Secondly, was the Order in Council adopting Art. 40 of the
Declaration of London so contrary to such a rule that the Order
was invalid; or was. it sufficiently consistent with such a rule,
or did it so Initigate the rule in favour of the enemy, that it
acquired validity, in accordance with the· doctrine stated by
the Privy Council in the Za1nora? Or, thirdly, did the acts of
the representatives of the various Powers at the Conference, and
the subsequent action and practice of their States, bring into
existence, by a sufficiently general consensus of view and assent,
a new or modified rule of the law of nations upon the subject, to
which effect ought to be given in their Prize Courts. at the
pre~ent day, apart from any Order in Council?
As to the first, havjng regard to the decrees and practices of
the nations for the last 100 years., I should feel bound to de·clare
that the rule which prevailed before the relaxation introduced a
century or more ago shquld be regarded as valid at the present
day. 'l'his means that the so-called well-established rule in
favour of a contraband-laden ship contended for by the claimants
does not exist. In the days of the relaxation referred to, the ship
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"as subject to confiscation in many respects, which were smnetime·s called exceptions. It has always been held that if any
part of the contraband carried belonged to the owner O'f the
ship, the ship itself was subject to the penalty of confiscation,
as was the · contraband. According to our most recent writers,
the vessel suffered if her owner \Vas privy to the carriage o.f the
contraband goods, whether they belonged to him or not (see
'Vestlake, p. 291; I-Iall, p. 666). In the present day, even more
than in the past, the owner must be taken to know either
directly or thi·ough the master how this vessel is laden, or to
what use she is put. * * *
Secondly, it follows, frmn what I have stated, that the provisions of Art. 40 were a lin1itation or m tig=ttion of some of the
rights of the Crown; and the result of the decision in the Zanwr a
is that accordingly the provisions in the Order in Council are
valid.
Thirdly, although there is no formal instrument binding as an
international convention, I think that the attitude and action
of the most important m:lritilne States before and since 1908
have been such as to justify the Court in accepting as: forming
part of the law of nations at the present day a rule that neutral
vessels carrying contraband which by value, we ght, volu1ne or
freight value, forms more than half the cargo, are subject to
confiscation, and to condemnat:on as good and lawful prizes of
war. ( [1916] P. 226.)

On appeal to the judicial committee o£ the pr1vy
council, it 'vas said in 1917:
Their Lordships consider that in this state of the authorities
they ought to hold that knowledge of the character of the goods
on the part of the owner of the ship is sufficient to justify the
condemnation of the ship, at any r=tte where the goods il~ question
constitute a substantial part of the whole cargo. ( [1918] A. C.
148.)

Departm.ent of State, 1.915.-Ea.rly in 1915 Senator
Stone, o£ the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
sun1marized co1nplaints and charges 'vhich had come to
him on the observance o£ neutrality by the United States.
These he submitted to · the Secretary o£ State under 20
heads. The replies to so1ne o£ these shov-v the attitude of
the Department o£ State at the time:
( 4) S,u bmission w·ithout protest to Bri.tish v·iolation.s of the
rules re.cJardln,q absolu.te and conditional contraban.d as laid. doton
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in The Ha,g ue conventions, the DBclarafi.on of London, and internati.ona-l law.

· There is no Hague convention which deals with absolute or
conditional contraband, and, as the declaration of London is
not in force, the rules of international law only apply. As to
the articles to be regarded as contraband, there is no general
a greement between nations. It is the practice for a country,
either in time of peace or after the outbreak of war, to declare
the articles which it will consider . as abs?lute or conditional contraband. It is true tha.'t a neutral Government is seriously affected ·,
by this declaration as the rights· of its subjects or citizens may
be impaired. But the rights and interests of belligerents and
neutrals are opposed in respect to contrahand articles and tr3-de
and there is no tribunal to which quest:ons of difference may
be readily submitted.
The record of the United States in the past is not free from
criticism. When neutral this Government has stood for a restricted list of absolute and conditional contraband. As a belligerent, we have contended for a liberal list, according to our conception of the necessities of the case.
The UnLed States has. made earnest representations to Great
Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British
authorities of all American ships or cargoes bona fide destined
to neutral ports, on the ground that such seizures and detentions
were contrary to the existing rules of international law. It will
be recalled, however, that American courts have established
various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of " continuous
voyage" has been not only asserted by American tribunals but
extended by · them. They have exercised -the right to determine
from,. .the circumstanc~s '~hetl:ter . the O$tensible - was the real
destination. They have held that the shipment of articles of
contraband to a neutral port " to order," from which, as a matter
of fact, cargoes had been transshipped to the enemy, is corroborative evidence ~hat the cargo is really destined to the enemy
instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen that
some of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals
at the present time are analogous to or ou:growths from policies
adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent. The
Government therefore can not consistently protest against the
application of rules which it has followed in the past, unless
they have not been practiced as heretofore.
( 5) Acquiescence W'ithout protest to the inclusi-on of copper and
other articles in the British lists of absolute contra;band.

The United States: has now under consideration the question
of the right of a belligeren~ to indude "copper unwrought" in
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its list of absolute contraband instead of in its list of conditional
contraband. As the Government of the United States has in the
past placed " all ar~icles frmn which ammunition is manufactured" in its contraband list, and has declared copper to be a1nong
such 1naterials, it necessa1;ily finds smne embarrassment in dealing with the subject.
lVIoreover, there is no instance of the United States acquiescing
in Great Bri.ain's seizure of copper shipments. In every case,
in which it has been done, vigoi'ous repr~sentations have· been
made to the British Govern1nent, and the representatives of the
United States have pressed for the release of the shipments.
( 6) Sub1nission without protest to interference with American
trade to neutral countri'es in conditional and absolute contraband.

The fact that the com1nerce of the United States is interrupted
by Great BrLain is consequent upon the superiority of her navy
on the high seas. History shows that whenever a country has
possessed that superiority our trade has been interrupted and
that few articles essential to the prosecution of the war have
been allowed to reach its enemy from this country. The department's recent note to the British Govern1nent, which has been
made public, in regard 1o detentions and seizures of American
vessels and cargoes, is a cmnplete answer to this complaint.

*

*

*

*

*

*

( 8) Subn'Vi,ssion to British interference u;,ith trade in petroleum,
1·ubber, leather, wool, etc.

Petrol and other petroleum products have been proclaimed by
Great Britain as contraband of war. In view of ~he absolute
necessity of such products to the use of submarines, aeroplanes,
and motors, the United States Govern1nent has not yet .reached
the conclusion that they are improper!~ included in ' a lis:: of
contraband. Military operations to-day are largely a question of
motive power through mechanical devices. It i.s therefore difficult to argue successfully against the inclusion of petroleum
among the .articles of contraband. As to the detention of cargoes
of petroleum going to neutraJ countries, thi~ Governn1ent has, thus
far successfully, obtained the release in every case of detention
or seizure which has been brought to its attention.
Great Britain and France have placed 111bber on the absolute
contraband list and leather on the conditional contraband li'st.
Rubber is extensively used in the 1nanufacture aud operation of
rnotors and, like· petrol, is regarded by son1e authorities as essential to motive power to-day. Leather is even more widely used
in cavalry and infantry equipment. It is understood that both
rubber and leather, together with wool, have ' been e1nbarg9ed by
most of the belligerent countries. It will be recalled that the
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United States has in the past exercised the right of embargo
upon exports of any commodity which might aid the· enemy's
cause. (Senate Doc. No. 716, 63d Cong., 2d sess.)

Pa.rlianventarry discussioni of contraband, 1916.-The
British Government in 1916 \vas much concerned \vith deterinining \vhat should be classed as contraband and there
were differences o£ opinion. Mr. Leverton Harris, who
had been directly associated with the administration, said
in January, 1916:

..

I do not think it ought to be assu1ned that e-verything which
reaches Germany or Austria benefits those countries or assists
them to win the \Var. That vvas rather the· line·, I think, taken
by the right hon. Gentleman opposite1 (Sir II. Dalziel). I know
there are· many peop·le· in this country who would like to see· every
conceivable commodity stopped frmn reaching our enen1ies. Personally I do not agre·e with then1. On the contrary, I think
there are many goods which have· reached, and may to-day, be
reaching Germany and Austria which are· doing those countries a
considerable a1nount of harm, and giving their Gove-rnme·nts a
great deal of anxiety. It would lJe very instructive· and inte-re~ting if some· expe-rt could prepare· a list of articles which are
being imported, or are in the habit of be.fng ilnported, into enemy
countrie·s, and classify the·m according to their military or eco-noinic value. Such a list would obviously start vvith such things
as shells and other munitions; next you would find the· raw materials or senii-manufactured articles which have a ce·rtain military
value; then you might place· food supplies, beginning possibly
with such articles as ¥lard, oil, and other fatty substances which
are so much needed in Germany at the present 1noment; then
you would come to articles. which are· used for the purposes of
manufacture or co1nmerce·; and lastly, you would come to articles
of pure luxury, the· list ending perhaps with something like
dia1nond necklaces or ve1;y expensive· pictures. Eve·r ybody is
agreed that it is essential to do everything we· can to stop from
going to Ger1nany or Austria those· articles which will appear at
the top of the list-that is to say, articles of any military value
or of any value as an ecc-nomie food for the· population in enemy
countries. On the· other hand, the· importation into Germany or
Austria of such articles: as appear at the· bottmn of the· list does
not prolong the '\Var for one· minute·; in fact, I suggest that such
in1portation does material harm to our ene·mies and may shorten
the \Var. Articles of luxury, such as jewe1s, and so on, have to
be paid for like everything else, and they have to be· paid for either
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by exchange operations or: else in gold or by the export of securities, with the result that we see at the present thne-the very
great depreciation in the value of the 1nark. The difficulty one
has to face is in regard to the classes of articles that fall in the
centre of the list, such articles, for instance, as tea or cocoa. I
have changed my mind n1ore than once about tea. Tea, I think,
does not possess any very great military value, although I understand it is an alternative ration. It is certainly found that
whilst we in this country are trying to keep certain classes of
these goods away fr01n Germany, the German Government also is
endeavoring to check the1r sale. The German Government is
doing all it can to prevent certain classes of articles, which are
more or less luxuries or not necessities, fron1 con1ing in fron1
abroad and having to be paid for by the export of gold or securities. (Parliamentary Debates, Cmnmons [19'16], LXXVIII, p.
1309.)
This I will say in conclusion: The vital thing is to succeed in
stopping German conunerce. I believe we have a perfect right
to do that· by every principle of international la\v. I believe
it is perfectly legitimate for a belligerent to cut off all c01nmerce
from his enemy and to destroy and injure it by econmnic pressure
exerted to the fullest extent quite as much as by any 1nilitary
operation. I am sure it is not only a legitimate and effective
but that" it is also a humane method. I a1n quite sure that since
this country has the power to exercise· it this country ought
to do so to the full. With that I think we ought to combine
absolute respect for the rights of other nations. vVe ought to set
an example of law-abiding and just treabnent eYen of the s1naller
natious, and I believe myself that that policy, which I am convinced is right and in accordance with the best principles of
British conduct in the past, is also the wisest and effective policy
if we desire to carry out the main object of all these operations,
namely, the destruction of the power of the enemy. (Ibid. p.
1816.)

British statement, 1916.-Lord Robert Cecil, Undersecretary of State £or Foreign Affairs, replying to a
question in the House of Commons, March 9, 1916, said:
I have constantly told the House that, in my vie·w, the
Declaration of London is an instrument which has no binding
force whatever. The position with regard to this country is
that certain parts, only certain parts, were selected at the outbreak of the War by the Government of the day as embodying
what they believed· to be the principle of international law
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applicable to belligerent conditions, and believing that to be the
case they" hav-e , ag~,eeq, aqd they .thil~k ,it a co.nvenient form, to
refer to the Declaration of London as embodying it. But the
Government never intended-at any rate, this Government does
not intend-to be bound by the Declaration of London, apart
from and so far as it differs from the principle of international
law which prevailed at the outbreak of the vVar. I very much
doubt, and it is very much doubted by lawyers, whether the
issue of an Order in Council that the Government intend to adopt
the Declaration of' London would bind the Prize Court, and it
is a matter of great doubt, in point of fact, if that Declaration
contained principles and doctrines which were· not in accordance
with the principles of international law. But I can not make it
too clear whether that is so or not, the policy of the Government
is to abide by the principles of international law whether they are
in favour of or against us, and to adhere to the·m, and them only,
and it is only so far as the Declaration of London embodies those
principles that they have any intention of be-ing bound by its
provisions. (Parliamentary De pates, Commons [1916], 80 H. C.
Deb. 5 s., p. 1813.) * * *
If they are changes in principles, they ought not to be made,
but if they are merely applying the principles to new conditions,
that is not a change. All English lawyers are profoundly familiar
with that. It is just as the ordinary growth of case law. You
have your principle of law which is applied to the particular circumstances of each case, and the· rulings thereupon being made
make new definitions of the principle of law, which none the less
always existed before those decisions. That is what I intended to
convey, and that is, I think, the only sound vie·w. (Ibid. ,P·
1814.) * * *
I am not quite sure what is meant by this phrase of a "real
blockade." I do know that such legal opinion as I have been
able to consult agrees with my own impression that to make any
Declaration of Blockade, as we should have to do under the
ordinary rules of international law, defining the limits and showing . where the line of blockade was to be, if we attempted to . do
anything of that kind I think we· should find ourselves in much
greater legal difficulties than we find ourselves in at the present
time. I do not see that we should get anything whatever by doing
so. My hon. and gallant Friend said, "Why not apply the doctrine of continuous voyage?" We have applied it and worked
it, and it is the very foundation of the whole of the action which
we have taken. You can not blockade' an enemy through a
neutral country except by the operation of that doctrine. Our
plan is to arrest all commerce of Germany, whether going in or
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·• coming ·out, whether -it.-con1es through a neutral port or a German
port; that is the whole object and the whole difficulty of our
position. We have to discover for certain what is German and
what is neutral commerce. I can not understand what more you
can do by blockade. (Ibid. p. 1815.) * * *

British contraband list, 1916.-0n April 13, 1916, the
British foreign office issued a list of articles declared
contraband of war, saying:
The list comprises the articles which have been declared to be
absolute contraband as well as those which have been declared
to be conditional contraband. The circumstances of the present
war are so peculiar that His :Majesty's Government consider that
for practical purposes the distinction between the two classes of
contraband has ceased to have any value. So large a proportion
of the inhabitants of the enemy country are taking part, directly
or indirectly, in the war that no real ·distinction can now be
drawn between the armed forces and the civilian population.
Similarly, the enemy Government has taken control, by a series of
decrees and orders, of practically all the articles in the list of
conditional contraband, so that they are now available for Government use. So long as these exceptional conditions continue
our belligerent rights with respect to the two kinds of contraband
are the same, and our treatment of them must be identical. (Par.
Papers, Misc. No. 12 [1916].)

This list enumerated about 170 articles arranged alphabetically from " acetic acid and acetates " to " zinc."
Lists of contraband and oatogovries.-The attempt to
make lists of articles which may be declared contraband
of war has in earlier wars, as in the World War, led to
many controversies. Grotius, in 1625, however, enumerated the categories within which articles absolutely
contraband, conditional contraband, and free articles
might fall, though, as previously stated, not using the
term "contraband." The practice of publishing lists of
contraband has made it necessary to make frequent additions and changes in the list, which make the administration of the laws in regard to contraband difficult for the
belligerent and the observance difficult for the neutral.
While the Instructions for the Navy of the United
States Governing Maritime Warfare of June, 1917,
~
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referred to a contraband list, it 'vas a classification by
categories, leaving a reasonable freedom for both belligerent and neutral. Article 24 of these rules is as follo-ws :
The articles and materials mentioned in the following paragraphs (a.), (b), (c), and (d), actually destined to territory
belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to armed forces of
tbe enemy, and the articles and materials mentioned in ~he
following paragraph (e) actually destined for the use of the
enemy Government or its _armed forces, are, unless exempted
by tre·a ty, regarded as contraband.
(a) All kinds of arms, guns, ammunition, explosives, and
machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts
thereof; materials or ingredients. used in their manufacture;
articles necessary or convenient for their use.
(b) All contrivances for or means of transportation on land,
in the water or air, and machines used in their manufacture or
repair; component parts thereof; materials or ingredients used
in their manufacture; instruments, articles or animals necessary
or convenient for their use.
(c) All means of communicati~n, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, mach:nes, or documents, necessary or convenient for carrying on
hostile operations.
(d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt ; also metal,
materials, dies, plates, machinery or other articles necessary or
convenient for their manufacture.
(e) All kinds of fuel, food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing
and articles and materials used in their manufacture.

In a list of articles of contraband of war it is customary to name clothing of military character. In
modern \Varfare the important supply for a belligerent
may Be clothing of all kinds, as the supply of one kind
of clothing may make it possible by substitution to supply another to the arn1ed forces because almost any kind
of clothing may be used for certain services ·where the
combatants are not brought into immediate contact.
British decisions in W ovrld W ar.-The doctrine of continuous voyage received attention from time to time in
the British CQUrts during the World War. The conditions of commerce were such as to make transportation
through neutral countries common.. An elaborate staternent on the subject was n1ade by Sir Samuel Evans in the
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case of the Ki1n, the Aufred Nobel, the Bjornsterjne
Bjornson, and the Fridland, decided in Septe1nber, 1915.
He said:
I have no hesitation in pronouncing that, in 1ny view, the
doctrine of continuous voyage, or transportation, both in relation to carriage by sea and to carriage over land, had become
part of the law of nations at the commencement of the present
war, in accordance with the principles of recognized legal decisions, and with the view of the great body of modern jurists,
and also with the practice of nations in recent maritime warfare.
The result is that the court is not restricted in its vision to
the primary consignn1ents of the goods in these cases to the
neutral port of Copenhagen; but is entitled, and bound, to take
a more extended outlook in order to ascertain whether this
neutral destination was n1erely ostensible and, if so, what the
real ultimate destination 'vas.
As to the real destination of a cargo, one of the chief tests is
whether it was consigned to the neutral port to be there delivered
for the purpose of being in1ported into the co1n1non stock of the
country. * * *
The argument still remains good, that if shippers, after the
outbreak of the war, consign goods of the nature of contraband to
their own order without naming a consignee, it may be a circuinstance of suspicion in considering the question whether the goods
were really intended for the neutral destination, and to become
part of the common stock of the neutral country, or whether they
had another ulthnate destination. Of course, it is not conclusive.
The suspicion arising from this. form of consignment during war
might be dispelled by evidence produced by the shippers. It may
be here observed that son1e point was 1nade that in 1nany of the
consignments the bills of lading were not made out "to order''
simpliciter, but to bran~hes or agents of the shippers. ~rhat
circumstance does not, in my opinion, make any material difference. (The Kint [1915], p. 215; see also 1922 Naval War College,
p. 50, 96-98.)

In the case of B own.a in 1918, the question was as to
the condemnation of 416 tons of coconut oil shipped on
a Norwegian steamship and seized in a Bristol port. The
Crown contended that it rested on the claimants who
were neutraTto establish that the destination of the oil was neutral ; and,
further, that the oil was subject to condemnation on the ground
1802-29--3
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either (1) that it, and the 1nargarine for the n1anufacture of
which it was acquired, should, in the circumstances, be deemed
to have an enemy destination; or (2) that such margarine, when
manufactured, would to the knowledge of the claimants be consumed in Sweden in substitution for Swedish butter to be
supplied to Germany. (The B,__~nna [1918], p. 123; see also 1922
Naval vVar College, p. 172.) * * *
Statistics were given in evid~nce to show the increase of the
importation into Sweden of raw materials for margarine and of
the production and sale of margarine, and to show the s:multaneous increase of the export of butter from Sweden to Germany.
They were interesting, and- beyond doubt they proved that the
more margarine was made for the Swedes the more butter was
supplied by them to the Germans; and that when by reason of the
naval activity of this country the imports for margarine production became diminished, the Swedish butter was kept for consumption within Sweden itself and ceased to be sent to the
enemy. (Ibid. p. 175.)

Oonsignments.-In early ti1nes the place to which
goods of the nature of contraband were .to go ·was much
more a matter of vital concern to a belligerent than the
person of the consignee. Gradually the person to whom
the goods are consigned has become a more in1 portant
factor in determ.ining the ultima.te destination of such
goods. During the World War, when th~ means· of
transportation were so highly developed, there arose
many questions in regard to consignments.
In 1921, on appeal, a case was brought before the
judicial committee of the privy council and Lord Parmoor
stated:
The appellants are an import and export company claiming
on behalf of Enrique Rubio, who was the shipper and consignor
of certain boxes of Valencia oranges seized on the Norwegian
steamships Nome, Grove, and Haraanger, during December, 1915,
while on voyages from Valencia, in Spain, to Rotterdam, in
Holland. The amount involved is not considerable, but it was
stated that the case had been selected as a test case which would
govern a number of other cases. * * *
The consignee named in the bill of lading covering the oranges
shipped on the Norne was A. J. de Graaf, and the consignee
named in the other h':o bills of lading, covering the oranges
shipped on the Grove and H ardanger, 'vas Van Hoeckel. * * *
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The contention of the appellants is that the destination of·
the voyage was Rotterdmn, and that if the voyage had been
carried through without interruption the oranges would in the
ordinary course of business have been offered to local dealersat public auction, thereby becoming part of the common stock
of a neutral country, to whatever consumers they might ultimately
be sold. It was said that if thi~ contention is not accepted, and
it is held that the anticipation that a large proportion of the·
oranges n1ay go for consu1nption in Germany is sufficient to
make them contraband, the consequence is that goods within
the category of conditional contraband would be liable to seizure
and condemnation wherever there was antic~pation that they might
be largely sold to enemy customers. * * *
Their Lordships are unable to hold that the mere fact that
goods will be offered for sale by auction at the port of arrival
is in itself conclusive of the innocency of their destination. It
would appear to them to be too wide a generalization that
whatever • the special condition's may be, · the goods could never
be· condemned as contraband, if once it is established that they
would be offered at public auction in a neutral market. (1921
A. C. 765.)

On other grounds it was decided that at the time of
seizure there was a substantial interest in the consignment held by a Ger1nan firm and the judgment of the
prize court that the oranges were la w:ful prize was.
affirmed.
Position of Admiral Rodgers.-Writing in 1923, Ad-mir'al ,V. L. Rodgers, United States Navy, ·took the ·
point o£ view that modern trade systems call :for change&.
in international law.
Blockade and contraband both operate against the organized"!
belligerent effort of the hostile government. But new develop-·
ments of international trade and transportation are rendering
it possible that adherence to the old rules makes it increasingly
difficult for a belligerent to disorganize and disrupt the national\
life of the enemy, yet this is a legitimate and humane method.
of practicing war.
The basis of principle of the chief rules now current were·
established before commerce and transportation assu1ned their
present great scale through the agency of steam power. The·
size of nations, their power and their complexity have become·
so great that the old I:ules of contraband and blockade need great:
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modification. Present-day practice, ho'\vever, by certain great
powers., is. in accord with present world -conditions, no matter
how loud conservative outcry may be against current practice.
Qreat Britain's position of tnaritilne preponderance for over a
century has given her a singularly clear insight into the workings
of i.nternational law. As we now wish to rival Great Britain in
our merchant trade, we can not fail to find our national advantage
in accepting the views of international law which she has so
consistently tnain tained.
·The position of the United StatEs administration of the day,
representing the nation, has. varied according to requirements
and interest of the nation, (or of special class interests), as it
was either be1ligerent or neutral. Other nations vary in the
same way.
•
In t"me of our neutrality we have stood for neutral rights
of trade and frcedo1n of the seas. In tilne of' our belligerency
we have stood for the rigor of the gatne, extension of contraband lists, continuous voyage, etc. In the Civil War our stand
on continuous voyage was a forward step for belligerent privilege. Our views of immunity for private property during that
war were different from those we urged before and after that
period when other peoples were at war. and the United States was
neutral. · (17 Atner. Jour. Int. Law [Jan. 1923], p. 7.)

Opinion of Sir Erle Richarrds.· The late Sir Erie
Richards, vvho often during the \Vorld "'\Var maintained
before British courts the rights of neutrals, said :
The particular items which can properly be included in lists of
contraband must depend to some extent on the particular circumstances of each war, but it seems certain that belligerents
must have the right to determine those lists in the first instance.
An attempt to enforce fixed lists of contraband, irrespective of
any future advance in chemistry, was made at the London Conference; but the agreetnent there arrived at was found to be
wholly impracticable, al}d was abandoned by e:very one of the
belligerent Powers. The scheme of the Declaration of London
was to have three Hsts: the first of articles which might be
treated as absolute contraband, the second of articles which
might be treated as conditional contraband, the. third of articles
1-vhich could never be declared contraband at all. But these lists
pi·oved to be wholly inappropl'iate, and the war had not long
been in progress before it was found that some articles in the
third or free list were essential to the manufacture of munitions:
raw cotton, rubber and metallic ores, for instance, were found td
be of such importance in tnunition tnaking that they were declared
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. to be absolute contraband, although in 1909 it had been agreed
that they should never be declared contraband at all. The Allies
refused to be bound by the Declaration in this respect- from the
very first, and the Central Powers soon followed suit. This
experience te-aches us that it is impossible to have lists fixed in
neutral. · (17 An1er. Jour. Int. Law [Jan. -1923], p. 7.)

1.1!oore on doctrine of contraband.-J udge M;oore in
1923, referring to the practice and argun1ents made during and subsequent to the World 'V ar in regard to absolute and conditional· contraband, said:
During the recent wa1:· there were exigent belligerent 1neasures
which in effe·ct n1erged the second category in the first. 'l'h~se
1neasures were defended on the ground that the " circ'Q.mstances"
of the war were "so peculiar" that "for all practical purposes
the distinction between . the two elasses of contraband " .had
"ceased to have value"; that "so large a proportion of the inhabitants of the enemy ·country" were ''taking part in the war,
directly or indirectly,_ that no real distinction" could be drawn
"between the arn1ed forces and the civilian population"; . that
"sin1ilarly" the ene1ny governn1ent had "taken control, by a
series of decrees and orders, of practically all the articles in the
list of conditional contraband, so that they are now available for
government use"; and that "so long as these except~onal conditions" continued, " belligerent rights in regard to the two kinds
of contraband" were the same and the "treatment of them must
be identical."
Probably under the influence of these arguments, and without
full appreciation of the implication, which they seem to have
been anxiously designed to convey, that the measures were to be
regarded as highly emergent and altogether exceptional, it has
lately been intimated that the distinction, defended and maintained through ::eons of almost forgotten time, between articles
absolutely and articles conditionally contraband, has been shown
by the recent war to be unsound and should no longer be preserved. One writer has indeed gone so far as to assert that
the distinction "dates from the time when armies we·re very
small, and comprised only a very small fraction of the belligerent
countries," a statement that would have astonished Grotius,
and that n1ust equally astonish those who are familiar with
the history, either legal or military, of the wars growing o-ht
of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic vVars. For reasol!s such as these it has been suggested, but not, I believe, by
any government, that the category of "conditional contraband"
should now be evacuated and decently interred, and its contents
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in the absolute list. The suggestion is startling, since
its acceptance would at once render illicit practically all trade
with countries at war, and put in jeopardy much of the trade
.even between countries not at war.
But we must not permit ourselves to be betrayed by illusions
of novelty. We do our ancestors grave injustice if we think
they admitted that a belligerent might capture at sea and confiscate all commodities destined to his enemy which perchance
might be used for a military purpose, but believed that belligerent governments then could not or did not appropriate within
their own jurisdiction whatever they needed for war. Our
ancestors were not so hopelessly senseless. They were, on the
contrary, consciously engaged in a conflict, which has not ceased,
between belligerent claims to stop trade and neutral claims to
carry it on. Neutrals denied the right of belligerents to capture
and confiscate anything but articles primarily useful for war.
So far as concerned foodstuffs, the defenders of neutral rights,
while fully aware that armies must and did eat, maintained
that the noncombatant mouths always vastly outnumbered the
combatant, so· that the preponderant consumption of food was
ordinarily not hostile. They carried their point, with the single
concession, the narrowness of which was ~utually and perfectly
understood, that foodstuffs should becml}e contraband if, when
seized, they were destined for distinctively military use. (Moore,
International Law and Some Current Illusions, p. 26.)

Admiral J ellicoe on treat1nent of seized vessels.Admiral J eUicoe, writ,ing o£ the operations o£ the British
fleet, 1914-1916, says:
The fate of the detained ship was decided in London on receipt
of the report of examination. As was perhaps natural, the
sentence on many ships' cargoes pronounced in London was not
accepted without question frmn the Fleet, and a good deal of
correspondence passed with reference to individual ships. \Ve, in
the Fleet, were naturally very critical of any suspicion of laxity
in passing, into neutral countries bordering on Germany, articles
which we suspected might find their way into Germany, and
constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the Admiralty,
and, later, to the lVIinistry of Blockade, when that :Ministry was
established. The difficulties with which the Foreign Office was
faced in regard to neutral susceptib:lities were naturally not so
apparent in the Fleet as to the authorities in London, and
though many of our ~criticisms were perhaps son1ewhat unjustifiable, and some possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main
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they were. of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giving th~ n~v~J point of view. (The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916, p. 76: )

0 onvoy and certification.-On April 16, 1918, the
Dutch lVIinister of Marine announced to the First Chamher that " the Government would send a convoy of Government passengers and goods to .the Netherlands East
Indies." Mr. Balfour in a dispatch to the minister at
The Hague said on April 25, 1918, that:
You should let the Netherlands Government know that His
Majesty's Govennnent of course do not recognise the "right of
convoy," and that they will exercise the belligerent rights of visit
and search of 1nerchant vessels· should the Netherlands Government carry out their proposal.
(Parlia1nentary Papers, Misc.
No. 13 [1918], p. 4.)

The Dutch, however, cont,i nued their preparations and
on April 29, 1918, the Netherlands Legation infotmed
Mr. Balfour that:
In connection with the decision of the Netherlands Government
to send a convoy to the Dutch East Indies to relieve military men,
and to send out Government officials with their families and some
urgently needed military and other Government goods, I have the
honour, in accordance with instructions received, to inform your
Excellency that the said convoy will be composed of the following:
1. Her Majesty's Hertog Hcn"drrik, accompanied by a coal boat
requisitioned for that purpose, for the purpose of bunkering
during the voyage.
2. A Netherlands merchant ship, transformed into a man-of-war
according to the rules of the VIIth Convention, 1917, for the
transport of military n1en to the Dutch East Indies, having as
cargo military stores.
3. ·A Netherlands 1nerchant ship requisitioned by the Netherlands Governn1ent under convoy of the man-of-war mentioned
sub 1 for the transport of Govern1nent passengers with their
families, and having for cargo exclusively goods of the Netherlands Govern1nent destined for the Government of the Du~ch
East Indies.
The loading of all goods and the embarkation of all passengers
·w ill be effected under strict supervision of Netherlands Government officials.
The passengers and their luggage will be submitted to a strict
examina~ion.
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No private correspondence may be carried. The ships carry
neither ordinary nor parcel mail.
.
Of the Govern1nent goods, the usual 1nanifesto \Vill be produced with certificates of origin issued by the Inspector of Import
Duties.
I have been directed to add that it is intended to send the
above convoy about the Iniddle of the month of June, and that
·it will sail round the Scottish Isles and the Cape of Good Hope.
(Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 13 [1918], p. 5.)

Various delays occurred, but on May 31 a co1nmunique
was issued by the Dutch explaining that:
'Varships will therefore only carry naval personnel and war
supplies, and l.he 1nerchant ships only Government passengers
with their families and Governn1ent goods. It is not intended to
institute under protection of warships commercial intercourse
which, without such protection, would not be permitted by the
belligerents according to their views of commercial liberty of
neutrals. No mail will be carried. It is obvious that convoy
commandant would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships. According to usage, he will, on meeting belligerent
warships, permit perusal of cargo documents in his custody by
com1nander at latter's request. In fact, those documents will be
cmnm unica ted l. o Powers concerned before departure from Netherlands. As is custon1ary in these times when despatching warships
with view to preventing n1isunderstanding in event of 1neeting
belligerent warships, notice has . been given to Governments of
belligerents of the despatch of the convoy. (Ibid. p. 7.)

On June 7, 1918, in a note to the Dutch n1inister at
London Mr. Balfour said:
2. I t was therefore with considerable sun1rise that _I received
on the 31st ultimo, by telegraph frmn Sir "\V. Townley, a translation of an official notice published in the Dutch press that
n1orning by the Ministry of :Marine at The Hague, announcing
an1ong other things that "the conunander of the convoy \vould
not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships."
3. In the face of this announcen1ent, so 1nade, His lVIajesty's
Government feel com1Jelled to reiterate in the 1nost formal manner
t hat the right of visit and search which Great Britain, whether
she was a neutral or a belligerent, has, in conformity with the
rules of internaaonal law, consistently upheld for centuries, is
not one which she calL abandon.
4. As the Netherlands Government is well aware, the claim
that in1munity from search is conferred on neutral 1nerchant ves-
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sels by the fact of their sailing under the convoy of a man-of-war
flying the national flag has never been conceded by this country.
By the course, therefore, which they are now pursuing, they do
in fact demand that Great Britain shall abdicate her belligerent
right to stop contraband trade by the regulated exercise of naval
force, and, in the middle of a great war, abandon the allied block·a de. This is a detnand to which Great Britain could not possibly
.accede. (Ibid. p. 8.)

After a lengthy me1norandu1n the British Government,
ho·wever, waived its " right of visit and search in this
particular case, as an act of courtesy " of an exceptional
nature, and the following staternent of conditions \vas
made:
(a) A detailed list of all passengers sailing in the convoy, to
be furnished to His :Majesty's Government, none but Dutch
Govern1nent officials and their fa1nilies beiNg alfowed to proceed.
(b) Full particulars of the cargo on board any merchant vessel
·sailing in the convoy to be supplied in the same way as is now
done by the Netherlands Oversea Trust in respect of ships under
their control.
(c) The Netherlands Government to give a forn1al guarantee
that no goods shipped in the convoy are ·either wholly or in part
·Of enemy origin.
(d) The ships sailing under the Dutch naval flag, including
the converted liner, not to carry any civilian passengers, nor any
goods or articles other than warlike stores destined for the
colonial authorities or forces, of \Vhich complete lists should be
furnished.
(e) No mails, correspondence, private pape1~s, printed nUttter,
{)r parcels to be carried by any ship in the convoy (except official despatches of' the Dutch Government).
(f) The convoy not to sail until the above stipulated particulars and undertakings have been furnished and have been
found satisfactory by the British authorities. (Ibid. p. 9.)

The Dutch Legation at London in a ~1ote of June 15,
1918, said:
In reply to the note you w·ere good enough to address to 1ne
()n the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you, in accordance
with instructions received, that the Netherlands Govenunent are
pleased to see that both the British and the Netherlands Governnlents agree as .to the mode of carrying out the plan for
the convoy mentioned therein. The conditions sbited corresnonrl
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almost identically with the intentions communicated in my note
of the 29th April, last. A complete list of passengers had also
been prepared, to be sent, together with full particulars of the
cargoes, to all foreign Legations concerned, as the Netherlands
Government wish to avoid ·even any possible impression that
anything is being concealed. They can not agree with the point
of view that their readiness to conform to the views of the
belligerents of the liberty of neutral cmnmerce is difficult to
reconcile with the \vbole plan of the convoy. The protection of
the men-of-war has the advantage of excluding all unneces-sary
delay. The Netherlands Government are fully aware that the
British Government do not recognise the right of convoy upheld
by the first-named Govern1nent and ali other nations, but,· in
their opinion, this point of international law can be left out of
account in the present case of a very special sort 'of convoy
destined to transport between the mother-country and its colonies
none but goods for the service of the Government and Government
passengers, with tlieir families. (Ibid. p. 10.)

This case involved official Government transport and
a for1n of certification which was resorted to as a matter
of convenience such as might often be found advantageous by both parties. Mr. Balfou(s note o£ June 7 had
referred particularly to neutral merchant vessels.
The "Black Lists."Closely connected with the legal conc-eption of trading with the
enemy, is the institution of the Statutory or ''Black Lists " initiated for the first tilne in 1915 by Great Britain and France. All
commercial intercourse by British and French citizens with the
persons or firms included therein was strictly forbidden on account of the ene1ny nationality or hostile associations of such
persons or firms. By section 1, subsection 3 of the Trading with
the Enemy (Extension of Powers) Act, 1915, corrections and
additions of further persons or finns to the Statutory Lists could
he made by Order in Council, and were in fact so Ina de from time
to time up to the· end of the war.
In the case of Great Britain, the adoption of the ''Black Lists"
was a distinct departure from the ordinarily and generally acCE!pted criteria governing enen1y character. The individuals or
corporations comprised in the lists with whmn intercourse by
British subjects was rendered illegal as involving trading with
the enemy, were persons or firn1s who, in the great majority of
cases, were resident -or carrying on business in neutral countries.
It would thus appear that, in so far at least as the "Black Lists"
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were concerned, Great Britain was applying the test of nationality,
and not the traditional criterion of domicile. (Colombos, Law of
Prize, p. 224.)

Proposal to prohibit. emport of contra:band.-At the
rneeting o£ the American Society o£ International Law in
1915, Professor Butte proposed that in time o£ war the
export o£ contraband be prohibited by neutrals. He
argued that:
Under present conditions, the captor always acts on the presuinption that. a neutral ship bound for an enen1y port or a
neutral port near ene1ny territory is transporting contraband.
Except when under convoy, such vessels carrying a 1nixed cargo
are presu1ned guilty. Their innocence 1nust be established by a
visit and search; their n1anifest and other papers have little
or no probative value. Under 1nodern conditions, with large
ships and large· miscellaneous cargoes, the search of each vessel
consu1nes 1nany hours, and not infrequently can not be carried
out on the high seas at all. The neutral ship is often taken into
the belligerent's nearest port and detained there for days to be
unloaded and reloaded, to the great damage and loss of neutral
shippers and shipowners. So long as neutral states allow the
export of contraband frmn their shores, it seems that they have
no just grounds of complaint against a thorough search of each
vessel intercepted by the belligerent, however long it may reasonably require and \vhatever the means that n1ay be reasonably
necessary. The belUgerent 1nust obtain for hin~self the ass·urance
that neutral states now fail or refuse to give. Surely the belligerent would be glad to be relieved of the burden, the liability, and
the endless difficulties and controversies with neutrals connected
with the execution of these n1inute searches, if he had some
assurance upon which he could rely that no contraband was put
aboard ship in neutral ports.
By the enforce1nent of such prohibitory statutes, neutral Inaritilne commerce would be safer, because the risk of confiscation of
ships or of conden1nation to pay expenses and costs because of
contraband found on board would be almost entirely eliminated;
and delays and losses to a shipper of innocent goods in the same
vessel would be avoided. A shipper of innocent goods can not
feel safe under the existing rules and the uncertainties as to the
doctrine of infection. How is he to know when he sends his
goods on board (unless he owns the ship hhnself) whether contraband will be carried, and if so, what proportion by .value,
weight, volume and freight of the whole cargo? And who knows
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what proportion in law infects the ship and renders it liable tQ
confiscation? His goods may be thrown out at the first convenient
port ; and it is incumbent upon hin1 to recover them and to reload
and reship them, if he can find the space, at his own expense. He
bas Iio recourse against the captol' for the interruption of his
trade, the da1nage to. himself or his custmners, or for other losses
by reason of the delay. In 1nany cases, €'specially if his goods
are perishable, he is fortunate if he recovers a fraction of their
value.
Further, the prohibition of the export of contraband frmn
neutral states would tend to restrain the belligerent from arbitrarily extending the list of contraband articles. (A1ner. Soc.
Int. Law, Proceedings, 1915, p. 127.)
7

1 reaty provisions.-The United States has been a party
to many treaties in \vhich certification in varying :for1ns
has been recognized as in the treaty with Bolivia, 1858:
ARTICLE

XXII

To avoid all kinds of vexation and abuse in the exa1ninat:on
of the papers relating to the ownership of the vessels belonging to
the citizens of the two contracting parties, they agree that, in
case one of them should be engaged in ·war, the ships and vessels
belonging to the citizens of the other must be furnished with
sea-letters or passports, expressing· the name, property and bulk
of the ships, as also the name and place of habitation of the
\
master and commander of said vessel, in order that it may thereby
appear that said ship truly belongs to the citizens of one of th~
parties; they likewise agree that such ships being laden, besides
the ~aid sea-letters or passports, shall also be provided with certificates, containing the several particulars of the cargo, and the
place whence the ship sailed, so that it n1ay be known whether
any forbidden or contraband goods be on board the san1e; which
certificates shall be n1ade out by the officers of the place \Yhence
the ship sailed in the accustmned fonn; without such requisites
said vessels may be detained, to be adjudged by the competent
tribunal, and 1nay be declared legal prize, unless the said defect
shall prove to be owing to accident, and supplied by testimony
entirely equivalent.
ARTICLE

XXIII

It is further agreed that the stipulations above expressed,
relative to the visiting and examination of vessels, shall apply
only to those which sail without convoy; and when said vessels
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shall be under conYoy, the ve-rbal declaration of the commander
·of the convoy, on his word of honor, that the vessels under
h~s protection belong to the nation whose flag he carries, and,.
when they are bound to an enemy's port, that they have no
contraband goods on board, shall be sufficient.

Other treaties contain identical or similar provisions:
Brazil, 1828; Central A1nerica, 1825; Chile, 1832; Colombia, 1824 and 1846; Dominican Republic, 1867; Ecuador,.
1839; France, 1778 and 1800; Guatemala, 1849; Hayti,
1864; Mexico,· 1831; Netherlands, 1782; Peru, 1851,, ~870,
and 1880; Prussia, 1785 and 1799; Salvador, 1850 and
1870; Spain, 1795; S·weden, 1783; Venezuela, 1836 and
1860.
0 ertification of ca:r go.-'The treaty proYisions ·just
n1entioned ·were aiined to secure regularity of papers
and to a void unnecessary delays. The papers ·would 'to
so1ne extent facilitate visit and search, but \Vould not
necessarily exempt the vessels from seizure. 'l.'he alJ....
sence of such papers \Vould n1ake the vessel liable to be.·
declar.ed prize.
, Various propositions have been n1ade £ron1 time to
time in regard to methods of avoiding · · the inconvenience
of visit .and search. _1\;fany of these plans have involved
placing of additional obligations upon the neutral. ' Some
of these contain obligations \vhich if not fulfilled by the·
neutral state '\vould give rise to ne\V international di:f:ferences and 1vould place a part of the burden· o£ the
war upon the neutral. Even if a neutral should be
conscientious in investigating and certifying the cargo
and character of a vessel about to leave port, such a vessel might take on cargo after leaving port as has been
the practice in the days of smuggling vvhen the rewards
are great. It can not always be presumed that. ''th~
officers investigating and certifying to cargoes would
not in so1ne countries yield to inducements to make false
returns. Under the proposed systems the right to visit.
and search \Vas to be reserved, thus placing the neutral
under a new obligation merely without necessarily·
relieving the vessel from any inconvenience.
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Professor Hyde in commenting on certain aspects of
the matters involved said:
Doubtless latitude should be accorded a belligerent in attenlpting to check traffic in contraband, and to ascertain its existence
on the high seas. The procedure, however, whereby innocent
ships are forced to deviate from their courses, put into belliget·ent ports and there submit to protracted searches as. a means of
indicating whether they or other vessels are participating in the
war, or are about to do so, appears to be at variance with the
demands of justice.
The British argument and the facts which supported it indicate why the· right of search as exercised in previous wars is inapplicable to n1odern conditions. There is solid reason for the
attempt to place within the reach of a belligerent, by some other
process less injurious to innocent shipping, information concerning the nature of neutral cargoes and the voyages of neutral
vessels. It is believed that neutral governtnental certification of
ships' papers would offer as reliable assurance as to facts. ascertainable by search as could be furnished by a neutral con~oy.
Moreover; the burden of making such certification might be fully
compensated by benefits derived frotn the freedom from annoyances under the systetn now prevailing. -General approval of a
procedure establishing reasonable neutral guarantees effected
through increasing governmental oversight of neutral commerce,
may cause the exercise of the belligerent rights of visit and
search to s.ink into a much desired desuetude. (2 Hyde, Int. Law,
p. 444.)

Doctor La-wrence had previously, as Professor Hyde
indicates, raised this question when after reciting the
facts as to the cases arising during the South African
war Doctor Lawrence says:
It is clear from the bare recital of these facts that in any
future naval struggle carried on by powerful maritime states the
position of neutrals possessed of a great mercantile marine will be
intolerable. The only way of escape is to modify the right of
search to such an extent that belligerents may obtain reasonable
assurance of the innocence of harmless cargoes, without inflicting
on neutrals the ruinous and humiliating process of deviation to a
.belligerent port and a complete overhaul therein of all the vessel
contains. The continuance of the existing state of things involves
grave danger of a great extension of any naval war that may
break out in the n~ar future. It is worthy of consideration
whether smne system of official certificates could not be devised,
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whereby neutral vessels could carry, if they chose, satisfactory
assurances that their passengers and cargoes consisted only of
the persons and goods set forth and described in their papers.
A visiting belligerent officer could then decide whether to effect a
capture or not, without the need of a preliminary search. (Principles of Int. Law, 4th eel., p. 473.)

Letters of as·su.ramce, 1917.-Lord Robert Cecil, Minister o:f Blockade and Undersecretary o:f State :for Foreign Affairs, said in the House o:f Commons, March 27,

1917:
There is one other device which I am going to describe to
the !louse and which has really been of great assistance to
the blockade. I should like to describe it, because I believe
it to be the type of device which ought to be employed in a
blockade of this description. About the time I was appointed,
the Con~u.~-General of the United States came to -see me, and
he pointed- out
1ne: "You say in your diplomatic representations to the United States that, after all, British goods suffer
just as much as American goods frmn the blockade, and that
we are not really injuring An1erican goods and American traders
in any way beyond the. injury which the British trader suffers.
That is not quite right, because the British trader can go to
your vV ar Trade Department before he makes any arrangements with regard to the shipping of the goods and he can
obtain a licence. 'Vhen he has got his licence he knows that it
is all right, and he can proceed to secure ship's space and make his
financial arrangements. He is able to carry on his trade without fear that it will be stopped at the last minute. That is
not the case in the United States. Cannot you do something to
supply that : ~ant·?" vVe thereppon organised a system of Letters of Assurance as it is called, in the States. It is perfectly
voluntary. Nobody need hike out letters of assurance unless
he wishes to do so, but if he likes to go to our authorities there
and make inquiries whether a particular ship is likely to meet
with difficulty, he can obtain frmn those authorities in America
letters of a·ssurance, and then the goods, generally speaking,
unless something except:onal intervenes, go through without
any trouble or difficulty. That device has been of enormous
importance in smoothing the difficulties which had before then
e~isted wjth America, and it. has been of equal importance in
enabling tis· to know exactly what is going on in reference to
exports from the ,United States to these neutral countries. It has
enabled us, without any unfairness or injustice, to regulate the
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supplies to these neutral countries.
(Parliamentary Debates,.
Con1mons, 9·2 H. C. Deb. 5 s., p. 254.) * * *
I think the visit of the Consul-General to me took place rathermore than a year ago, and I established this system as soon as it
could be established. I should think it is about a year ago. It
has taken some little tilne to get it in working order. It is
entirely a voluntary S~7 Stem, but now, though I do not say it is
universal, it is very largely utilized by traders between the
United States and neutral countries. In my judgment, as the
result of these measures and other measures, because, of course,.
they were accompanied by other measures of general tightening:-UP
the various devices which before existed, there has been for some
:tnonths past a complete cessation of overseas ilnportation into
enemy countries. I 'vill give s01ne instances of that in a n1oment.
My hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Peto) said that we
had really done nothing, at any rate up to the summer or the
third quarter of 1916, because we hacl not succeeded in stopping the trade of what I will call, roughly, the home produce
of these neighboring countries. I think he :tnust forget that
right through the early stages the question of the home produce
of neighboring neutrals was never raised. The whole question
which was then discussed was, "Are you really stopping the
overseas trade and the imports into Gerp1any?" That was accomplished completely, or substantially completely-nothing is
complete in this world-about June or July of last year. l * * *
I have had so:tne figures prepared. Three or four of them I
do not think will do any injury to the State, at any rate, some
of them will not. The form in which these figures have ~een
prepared deals with the whole of the neutral countries-that is
to say, the three Scandinavian countries and Holland, all in a
lump. After all, that is the real test. If you can show that the
impor~s into the whole of these countries have been reduced t()
something about either just over or just under the pre-war
normal figure, you n1ay fairly conclude that there is no considerable direct import into the enemy country. * ~ * *
I felt when we had succeeded in stopping all in1ports, apart
from questions of smuggling and things of that kind-ail overseas
imports-we still had not done all that was necessary in order to
complete the blockade of Germany. There was the question of
the home produce of the border neutrals. That is a much 1nore
difficult subject to deal with, as 1ny ho:t~l. Friends who have spoken
will realise. The foundation of a blockade is the prize ; that is ·
the sanction. An ordinary blockade entirely depends " upon it.
You can only stop ship~ and goods going to a blockaded port
'vhich are and can be conden1ned in a Prize Court. Where you
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have to deal with a direct blockade, the 1natter is perfectly
silnple. You n1erely have to ascertain that the ship ~s going to .
a blockaded port and put it into a Prize Court, and, if you can
prove that fact, the ship is condemned as a matter of course.
The House is aware that that is no~ the problem with which we.
haYe to deal here. We have to deal with an indirect blockade,
that is, . a blockade through neutral countries. There the position is much more difficult. You can stop and get condemned in a
Prize Court any goods which are going into the neutral countries,
the ulthnate destination of which is the enemy country. That is
described in our text books as "continuous voyage," and I believein the American text books it is described as the "doctrine of
ultima~e destination."
That is the point. We have acted to the·
full on that doctrine, and have stopped all goods, the ultimate,
destination of which was Germany or any enemy country. (Ibid.
p. 258.)

General.-It is evident .that the problem of ratio deter-mining liability of a vessel to condemnation is not confined to a single standard but may be value, vveight ~.
volume, or freight charges of cargo. Doubt. 1nay easily
arise as to any of these. Lists of named specific artieles,
eontraband of war, may not include all articles 'vhich
from their na.ture might be classed as contraband. The
enumeration of categories such as food, fuel, clothing·
may be inclusive though less definite. Foods consigned_
to order may be sent to a prize court. Some other consignments may be suspicious and receive si1n.ilar treatment. The burden of proof of liability before the 'Vorld
"'\Var rested, in general, on the captor. N a.turally the relation of ports of neutral states to the means of com1nunication with belligerent states would influence the·
opinion upon the probable ultimate dest.ina.tion of cargo
upon a vessel that had been brought-to for visit and
search. A certificate of a neutral official as to the innocent character of the goods might not be regarded as
proof of such character, as o.ther goods might have been
taken on at sea or elsewhere after sailing. A letter of
assurance from one belligerent might be a ground of·
suspicion to the .other that there was some collusion_
between the shippers and the belligerent.
1802-29--4
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GOODS ON NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSEL

The responsibility for seizure must res.t upon the conl.Inander of the visiting vessel of war. While the master
of a merchant vessel may consider that his vessel is
exempt from seizure, the commander of the visiting vessel
of war may have information not possessed by the master
of a merchant vessel and suspicion justifies taking the
merchant vessel before the prize court.
In the situation as stated there are goods of such character that they may by well-known processes be converted
into articles of special use in war and under mqdern conditions .the immediate consignment to a neutral port 1uay
have little significance in determining the ult,i mate dest ination. Certification of innocent character and similar
documents are not recognized as binding in internat,ional
law. The master has good grounds for maintaining
exemption from seizure, but these are not sufficient to
p reclude seizure.
SOLUTION

T he contentions of the master are not grounds sufficient to exempt the merchant vessel from ljability to
seizure.

